. We employ both network analysis and spatial econometrics.
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The vital role of oil and gas in the modern world economy makes the understanding of the governance of global energy one of the most important issues in both economics and political science (Looney 2012; Witte amd Goldthau 2010) .
1 Currently, about one-fifth of global trade consists of flows of fossil fuels (Ruta and Venables 2012) . Despite growing energy interdependence in terms of trade flows between countries, the international system lacks a central authority to foster the coordination of energy policy. Thus, the role of international governmental organizations (henceforth, IGOs) that regulate oil and gas is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the international energy market. Qualitative studies have previously analyzed the formation of relevant energy IGOs focusing primarily on OPEC (Mabro, 2006; Mikdashi, 1974; Tetreault, 1981) . Surprisingly, few studies have as yet quantitatively explained the choice to join an IGO.
2 As a consequence, the reasons why countries decide to form or to join energy IGOs have yet to be systematically explored. We fill this gap by developing a theory built on the diffusion literature and taking into account the trade and geostrategic relationships between countries.
Our main contribution to the literature on energy governance and international cooperation is to show that states use energy IGOs to improve or consolidate their market position while reducing the risk of suffering competitive disadvantage on the world market. Specifically, we find that a producer country joins energy IGOs in response to its main trade partners and direct competitors in the oil and gas sector having previously gained membership. According to our results, market shares of energy producing countries allow us to predict the diffusion of their memberships in energy IGOs. On the other hand, we find no evidence that market competition between oil and gas consumers is relevant to explaining membership in energy IGOs. We therefore detect a clear difference in the way producer and consumer countries perceive the role of energy governance.
This outcome is coherent with the theory on collective action and speaks to a broader literature in International Relations and International Political Economy. In the energy industry, cost differentials are not particularly high among producing states, which makes cooperation suitable. Energy companies in producing states are mostly state-owned, which moves the collaboration issue to the state level. Coherently with classic trade policy theory (see Bowman 1989) , in which producer states recognize that they would be better off cooperating but cannot obtain this result through the existing channels, they begin a transformation of their competitive game so that collaboration structures, that is, energy IGOs, emerge.
In our analysis pertaining to the use that states make of energy IGOs for improving their position in the energy market, we develop two additional 194 L. Baccini et al. insights that further support our main argument.
3 First, we find that countries join energy IGOs to effectively coordinate energy policies in the presence of common geostrategic and regional interests. Oil and gas transportation represents a pivotal element of both producer and consumer countries' energy security (Victor, Jaffe, and Hayes 2006) . Concretely, we demonstrate that states join the same energy IGO in response to a membership previously gained by countries with which they share oil and gas pipelines. The data on pipelines used to test this chain of diffusion are original. Second, we provide evidence that the institutional design of energy IGOs impacts the evolution of the corresponding organizational field. Indeed, specific provisions included in or excluded from the treaties are responsible for speeding up, through oligopolistic provisions, for instance, or slowing down the proliferation of the individual energy IGOs.
To test our main hypothesis, we rely on a newly compiled dataset that includes 34 IGOs, 153 countries and covers 38 years . We combine two different methods to explore the diffusion of energy IGOs. First, we use network analysis to describe the evolution of the energy IGO network from the 1970s to today. Specifically, we highlight the sequence in which IGOs were established, the main patterns of the emerging organizational field, and recent developments that are likely to affect energy governance in the coming decades. Second, we use spatial econometrics to estimate how interdependence between countries drives the diffusion of energy IGOs, as is emphasized by our theory. We model spatial interdependence using the insights gained by the network analysis and relying on the aforementioned concepts of trade and geostrategic proximity rather than geographic proximity.
This article is structured as follows. The next section describes the evolution of the interorganizational network of the relevant energy IGOs. The second section presents the theoretical framework, which serves as the basis for the discussion and develops our two main hypotheses. The third part introduces the spatial econometric model and outlines the methodology used to test the hypotheses. The fourth section gives the empirical results of the econometric analysis. The fifth section provides additional evidence to support our argument. Finally, some conclusions and implications are drawn.
THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL ENERGY IGO NETWORKS OF OIL AND GAS
Over the past 40 years, energy IGOs and their membership have proliferated dramatically. According to our sample selection, the number of energy IGOs in force now is 34 and almost every country is currently a member of at least one IGO. 4 Before developing our theory explaining how trade and geo-strategic relationships affect the proliferation of energy IGOs, we will illustrate the main historical events that shaped the evolution of the global energy IGO network.
5 Specifically, network analysis allows us to highlight two main features of the energy IGO network. First, from the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s, the network was heavily polarized between consumers and producers, and the network shows a high degree of regionalization. Second, there is evidence of increasing cooperation between oil and gas producers and consumers since the end of the Cold War.
As Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf (2011) note in their historical overview of the global energy system, there was no structured energy cooperation between countries until the early 1970s. This lack of cooperation was mainly due to the fact that the national energy markets had mostly been autarkic until World War II and that the US was the world's largest oil producer (Colgan et al. 2011:124) . As a consequence of an external shock, that is, the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia formed OAPEC in 1968, with the aim of coordinating oil supply during crises of energy supply and military conflicts.
Although it was initially created by moderate Arab countries, in order to depoliticize the energy trade, hawkish Arab countries in the early 1970s such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria were admitted to membership, so that the organization was led toward anti-Western positions. These became effective during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, when OAPEC imposed oil embargoes on the US and the Netherlands (and later on Portugal and South Africa) following their support for Israel. OPEC, for its part, imposed a relevant price increase, and the major companies were no longer able to compensate from other production regions.
The uncoordinated and competitive reaction of oil importing countries to the crisis further worsened the negative impact of the oil shortage on their economies (Colgan et al. 2011:126) . As a result of the unsuccessful management of the oil crisis, US Secretary of State Kissinger suggested the creation of an IGO of oil consumers to counterbalance the power of OAPEC (Colgan 2009; Keohane 1978) . Sixteen OECD countries took this suggestion, establishing the IEA at the end of 1974 (see Figure 1) . IEA was mainly an organizational platform emanating from the OECD to develop and implement a reactive emergency regime (see Keohane 1982) and to build up special expertise. The organizational field thus experienced the formation of a so-called bicomponent, indicating a clear polarization between producer and consumer countries. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the Energy Charter (see Figure 2 ) in 1991 was a major effort to integrate Russian energy production with Eastern and Western European consumer countries. These efforts to institutionalize intergovernmental cooperation notably included investment and transit issues. However, this first major effort to bridge the interest between a major export country and the transit and import countries failed, because Russia was not willing to subscribe to the Energy Charter treaty, as demonstrated by the fact it never ratified it and definitely opted out of it in 2009.
The most important current example of harmonizing producer and consumer interests worldwide is the formation of the International Energy Forum (2002) whose members include key oil exporters, such as Brazil, Russia, and Mexico, as well as large importers, such as France, Italy, and Japan. IEF's main goal is to improve the quality of the information available in the energy market, as the Joint Oil Data Initiative sponsored by IEF member countries shows (Colgan et al. 2011:129) . IEF is not the only case of an IGO formed by both oil and gas producers and consumers. At a regional level, the formation of NAFTA, a trade agreement that also regulates the energy sector, includes a large oil importer (the US) and a large oil exporter (Mexico). According to Cameron and Tomlin (2002:37) , energy policy was a crucial issue in the negotiation of NAFTA. Similarly, since ASEAN countries encompass all of China's energy-shipping routes from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Beijing insisted on making energy cooperation a cornerstone of the ASEAN-China PTAs signed on the 4th of November 2001. Moreover, regarding multipurpose organizations, energy is a crucial issue in the G20, in which there are both large oil consumers and producers. Figure 3 shows the current structure of the energy organizational field. We included additional information indicating as to whether an IGO (represented by a circle) or a country (represented by a triangle) is a net oil-and-gas importing (color blue) or exporting (color red) country. 6 The sizes of the triangles and circles are proportional to the net size of the importing and exporting entities, respectively. The network nodes (countries and IGOs) are placed in the field according to an algorithm reflecting network centralities. 7 We see that IGOs such as OPEC or the GECF are quite central players in the organizational field. We note also that single countries such as Russia and Norway are highly centrally located.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
With these historical insights in hand, we now advance the argument that the diffusion of energy IGOs is a function of competition over the oil and gas market.
According to the public choice view, governments establish international organizations in order to use them as international cartels of policy regulation (Vaubel and Willett 1991) . Competition does not arise only between oil and gas producers and oil and gas consumers, but also within the groups of buyers and sellers. Our core argument is that the decision to join IGOs regulating oil and gas depends on whether other states, and in particular the main direct trade competitors (in the oil and gas sector), are already members of these IGOs. Specifically, countries react to an IGO in which a main direct competitor is a member by either establishing a competing IGO or joining the same IGO, depending on the design of the energy IGO (for instance, the membership of the IGO may be open to all states or rather closed to a certain group of countries) and on geopolitical considerations (mainly based on states' military and economic alliances). We will explain the causal mechanism in detail in the following two subsections. However, before proceeding to present our theory, a conceptual disclaimer is needed. There is a widespread debate in the literature as to whether energy IGOs comprised of oil and gas producers can be considered a "cartel" (Colgan, 2011) . As such, in our analysis, we prefer the use of the term "coordinated oligopoly" (see Gilbert and Lieberman 1987; Stennek 1997) . We prefer this term as we acknowledge that the capacity to operate as a cartel does not depend solely on the scope of the organization and its members, but also on the financial and productive conditions of the market as well as on the stance of other market players, such as energy companies and consumer states. Thus, conditions favorable for the operation of an oil cartel have existed only in certain periods of history. We are now instead in the presence of an oligopolistic system whose members coordinate themselves.
Reacting to Direct Competitors
Why should countries react when their direct competitors join energy IGOs? With regard to buyers, we assume that they are confronted with the coordinated oligopoly argument just outlined, with the objective to impose prices as high as possible. From the example of the OPEC it is evident that cooperation maximizes the welfare of the coordinated oligopoly, but due to prisonerdilemma-like incentives, some countries free-ride. Blaydes (2004) notes that small producers constantly free-ride in OPEC at the expense of Saudi Arabia, increasing their incentive to be members.
For producers, being excluded from such a coordinated oligopoly is costly for two main reasons. First, a producer excluded from a coordinated oil oligopoly is likely to have little impact on oil and gas quota decisions and therefore upon price. Obviously, exceptions mainly ascribable to political reasons exist, as some producing countries that are less concerned about being left out from a coordinated oligopoly. For instance, Russia, a large producer, has never joined OPEC. There might be various reasons for this. For instance, sitting out of this organization has allowed Russia to free-ride on OPEC production cuts. Moreover, cultural and technological factors help explain why Russia acted differently from another large producer, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Russia has more outside options than other smaller and more remote producers, for example, Angola. However, close cooperation between OPEC and Russia has been deemed strategic for Moscow, to provide coordinated actions in keeping prices high.
8 Moscow has been much more active in the field of gas, where there was a gap that could still be filled by a Russian-led initiative, that is, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.
Another example concerns producers that depend mainly on a single buyer, such as Mexico and Venezuela (which sell oil mainly to the United States). Venezuela's political regime has long been working to increase its political and economic independence from the United States. Thus, OPEC has represented a major means by which to reinforce Venezuela's position through connection with other producers. Conversely, Mexico has been generally open to integration with the US economic and energy system. However, for the majority of relatively small and less powerful producers it is important to be part of a coordinated oligopoly. As Mingst notes (1977) , the pressure for Arab countries to join OAPEC in the early 1970s was very high, since the initially restricted membership of this organization monopolized the most important decision-making processes.
Second, the coordinated usage of energy resources as a political leverage to influence foreign and security policies was (and still is) widespread among producing countries. As for Arab countries, the cost of being excluded from OAPEC was particularly high, given the inability to have an impact on the Middle East turmoil in the early 1970s. For instance, the Saudi Petroleum Minister, Sheikh Yamani, said that OAPEC is "a means to realize success for Arab economic and foreign policy."
9 Beyond the Arab countries, being excluded by an energy IGO is likely to be costly for every country. For instance, Vietnam and Laos are two net oil producers which export mainly to ASEAN member countries, such as Singapore. Vietnam's and Laos's decision to join the ASEAN Pact in the 1990s was partially motivated by the increasing cooperation in the energy sectors among its member countries. This cooperation, developed in the Program of Action for Enhancement of Cooperation in Energy, and, later, the Plan of Action on Energy Cooperation, threatened Vietnam's and Laos's energy interests in the region vis-à-vis direct competitors, such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Nicolas 2009 ).
Admittedly, the pressure to join an IGO of consumers has less to do with the oligopoly argument, but still rests upon the public choice approach outlined above. For consumers, there are two reasons that we want to flesh out. The first reason has to do with information. Although some energy IGOs are often soft-law organizations, they provide information which is notably rare, and, therefore, highly valuable in the energy market (Harks 2010:249) . As Jackson (2008:154) puts it, access to information "shapes their incentives regarding which relationships to form or maintain and ultimately affect the network structure." This diffusion of information through the network of energy IGOs is particularly relevant for consumer states because it is expected to lower transaction costs for countries by implementing common standards, improving the quality of the available data, and increasing the transparency in energy policies implemented domestically. In turn, lower transaction costs facilitate interactions between members. 10 9 Quote reported in Gilani (1978:63) . 10 We acknowledge that information is a relevant issue both for consumer and producer countries. However, we speculate that consumers experience more difficulties in finding timely and reliable data to 202 L. Baccini et al. For instance, this argument, emphasizing the role of information, explains the success of the International Energy Forum (IEF) in bringing together both consumers and producers.
11 As the Director for Information and International Affairs for OAPEC, Wailid Khadduri (2005) , argues, "a wellinformed media with credible information and up-to-date data can provide better coverage and analysis to the interest of both producers and consumers." Membership in the IEF has boomed over the past decade. IEF member countries now account for more than 90% of global oil and gas demand, with fifty countries joining talks in the May 2008 meeting in Rome. We argue that this is a result of countries' perception that exclusion from an organization in which important trade partners (both oil and gas importers and exporters) take part and share crucial information has prohibitively high costs.
The second reason has to do with the costs that consumers face from being left out of an IGO. Energy security is a fundamental part of consumer states' national security. Fuel is vital for national defense, for the preservation of states' economic infrastructure, and it has to be obtained at affordable prices. Powers such as China and the United States can compete over the direct control of energy assets, but the majority of buyers do not have the economic and political strength to do the same. Thus, the main playground for consumers' competition is the creation of redundant and continuous networks of supply (Nicolas 2009 ).
For both producers and consumers, the pressure to join an IGO has also to do with specific mechanisms that mitigate the impact of external shocks. External shocks are endemic to commodity markets and mainly depend on the ownership of the goods. In principle, the market of energy makes no exception. In practice, since energy is a good with strong strategic characteristics, the energy market is more influenced by political choices than other commodity markets, making it less predictable on the basis of pure trade theory. Geopolitical issues that affect transportation routes, new investments, and the management of common infrastructure influence shocks in the energy market. The very basic explanation for trade shocks, that is, ownership, is peculiar for the energy market, as for most exporter countries it represents the only economic leverage. Energy IGOs reflect the intercorrelation between the political and economic components of the energy market in the attention given to discuss and work toward common positions on issues of energy security.
reduce market uncertainties because, unlike the producers, they do not control the energy sources. For a similar argument, see Bressand (2010) . 11 The role of the IEF as a vehicle of information and recruiter of data mainly serves the purpose of providing consumer countries with credible news of energy production and supply from producing countries, as demonstrated by the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI). In exchange, producer states are directly involved in the framing of international energy security policies Indeed, since its foundation, the IEA has designed a system to cope with oil supply shortages and disruptions. Specifically, the IEA requires its members to keep an oil reserve equivalent to their net import of oil for 90 days. In the event of a shock's shrinking the supply of oil, the IEA is allowed to distribute oil to its members so that their economies can still run. This "safeguard" mechanism, encompassed in the IEA provisions, helps stabilize the supply of oil in the short term and so the price.
12 Thus, the members of IEA have enjoyed an economic advantage over other oil and gas consumers in the event of an energy crisis. Although other consuming nations might have been free-riding on IEA's mechanism, most of these countries have subsequently joined the organization, showing that the benefits of doing so were minimal. As Rogoff (2005) notes, since consuming nations have become better adapted to oil volatility, oil price fluctuations no longer affect economic growth quite as much as in the 1970s and 1980s. We argue that the mitigating impact of IGOs on crises, which can be best understood as the construction of a working system toward emergency preparedness (Emerson 2006) , contributes to explaining why virtually every large oil consumer asked to join the IEA during the 1970s and 1980s.
The geostrategic nature of the energy commodity therefore makes markets of oil and gas particularly sensitive to external political pressures (Jakobson and Zhao, 2006) . For instance, the price of Brent rose in December 2011 when Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. It subsequently fell when the United States affirmed that Iran's attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz would not be tolerated. 13 Moreover, resources are spread unevenly in the world, and for the most part lie in politically unstable areas. We therefore combine our analysis of trade fluxes with two strategic aspects related to the commerce of energy: the role of pipeline infrastructure and the institutional organization of energy IGOs. Competition in influencing states' membership is not only a commercial one, but strictly involves a security aspect. We consequently dedicate the second part of our paper to explore and decline this aspect of state's membership in energy IGOs.
In sum, our main hypothesis is as follows: Every diffusion argument begs for an answer to the question: what explains the first energy IGO? As explained in the previous section, the first actions of the first energy IGOs, OPEC and OAPEC, were triggered by external shocks and traumatic transitions. Shocks and transitions in the energy market are often caused by conflicts. Since conflicts have occurred frequently in the Middle East over the past decades, external shocks are more common in the energy market than in other sectors. For instance, it is well documented that oil and gas price volatility is quite high, higher than that for the majority of other commodities (Harks 2010) . In order to account for these volatilities reflecting latent or manifest conflict, we control for oil price in the econometric analysis.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The model that we estimate includes a spatial lag of the dependent variable, weighted by trade relationships between countries, several alternative spatial lags, and control variables that capture economic and political factors that might influence the formation of an IGO. We thus estimate the following equation (accelerated failure time [AFT] specification):
where ln(t i ) is the number of years without a country joining an IGO, β 0 is a constant, β 1 and β 2 are the coefficients, X ij,t−1 is a vector of control variables, W ij is the connectivity matrix whose specifications are described below, and y i,t−5 is a variable that takes the value one if country i has joined an energy IGO over the previous five years. As a result, W ij y ij,t−5 is the vector of spatial lag terms. Finally, ∈ ij,t is the error term.
14 Our argument implies that for each country the cost of being excluded from the energy IGO network increases as the number of countries that are members of at least one energy IGO increases. In econometric terms, we expect to fail at a faster rate as time goes on, that is, the hazard rate increases monotonically. Thus, we opted for a parametric survival model. Per the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria, we selected the Weibull model. However, in the online appendix we show that our results hold also when using other parametric models such as the Gompertz model. 15 14 In line with advice contained in Ward and Gleditsch (2008) , we checked whether the inclusion of spatial lags is appropriate by calculating the Moran index, using the total number of IGOs joined by each country. The result confirms that there are statistically significant spatial correlations (at 99% level) between countries. 15 Survival analysis is the appropriate approach because we are dealing with right-censored data. See also Beck (2008) . The study by Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006) of the diffusion of bilateral investment As is common in panel data with a binary dependent variable, we use Huber (robust) standard errors clustered by country (Beck 2008:486) . These standard errors take account of possible heteroskedasticity (serial correlation) or intra-group correlation of the data. Finally, to account for the multi-spells problem, we estimated the models presented above including an inverse Gaussian distributed country-level frailty term that, as a Monte Carlo simulation shows, produces unbiased coefficients (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:142).
Dependent Variable and Main Covariates
To arrive at our dependent variable, for each country we coded whether it joins an IGO in a specific year. This allows us to calculate the time in years that a country goes without signing an IGO, that is, the hazard rate. In the baseline analysis, every accession scores one. However, in the section Additional Evidence, we relax the assumption that every organization is the same by looking at the design of energy IGOs and by distinguishing between types of energy IGOs.
In building our list of energy IGOs, we relied on Pevehouse Data, Yearbook of IGOs (2008 IGOs ( -2009 , as well as on original sources. Following Keohane (1984:239) , we considered those formal and informal organizations which act as energy regimes for countries, developing positive rules in the energy sector and providing effective stimuli for states to abide by those rules. For our analysis, we thus selected organizations which have energy policy and/or incentives for investments in the energy sector among their primary areas of cooperation.
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As a result, our database includes 34 of these IGOs. Only 28 of them were, however, included in our main econometric analysis, which analyzes 152 countries that have data available across 38 years, that is, from 1970 to 2007, while energy IGOs that precede and follow this time frame have been part of our additional evidence anlyses. 18 Our model explains 481 failures during the period under investigation. The unit of analysis is the country-year. agreements also uses a survival model. Darmofal (2009) provides an extensive analysis of the use of survival models with spatial effects. 16 The results are similar if we use Gamma frailty (see the online appendix). 17 We do not include IGOs that are global (that is, that include virtually all the countries in the world) and for which energy policy is only a marginal issue. For instance, we do not include the WTO, the IMF, or the G20. We also decided not to include the EU, because energy has only recently gained preeminence in the organization, while our analysis considers the provisions established at the birth of the IGO and we disregard updates. The EU adopted a common energy policy in 2005, and the Lisbon Treaty (2007) is the first treaty which contains explicit reference to energy solidarity of member states and established a shared competence in energy matters. 18 Since ASEAN and OAPEC were formed before 1970, they are not included in our dependent variable. However, both ASEAN and OAPEC are included in our spatial lags (yi, t−5) , that is, they trigger the formation of other energy IGOs in the five years after their creation.
The main independent variables are N × t spatial weight matrices. A spatial weight matrix measures the impact of a policy change in a country on all other countries. It uses specific factors, such as spatial proximity or degree of economic interdependence, to weigh the importance of a policy change in one unit for other units. In our case, the policy change is whether a country joined an IGO between one and five years ago. The variable is lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity bias. This may lead to an underestimation of the spatial effect if countries already react to other countries' announcement of negotiations of IGOs, but it also mitigates concerns about endogeneity (Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006) . The reason for the five-year cutoff point is that after some time, the external effect of an IGO should disappear, with countries either having successful joined an IGO or having adapted to the new situation.
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The risk of suffering a competitive disadvantage in a world market as a result of being excluded from an IGO is particularly high for countries which compete in the oil and gas sector. We measure the degree to which two countries compete in the same market by identifying big exporters and big importers of oil and gas. We operationalize the argument by reasoning that country A should feel threatened by an IGO between B and C (D, E, . . .) if (1) country A and country B are both large exporters of oil and gas, or (2) country A and country B are both large importers of oil and gas.
20
Data on bilateral trade flows in oil and gas are taken from the COMTRADE dataset (United Nations 2009) and they are disaggregated at the sector-bysector level using the SITC (Rev. 3) classification. We lag the measure by one year to avoid simultaneity bias. 21 More formally, the spatial weights of the variables Spatial Competition (producer) and Spatial Competition (consumer) for country A are: 
.(t−5)
19 The five-year cut-off point is also consistent with the operationalization used by Egger and Larch (2008) in explaining the proliferation of PTAs. Our results are not sensitive to a five-year cut-off point threshold: we obtain similar results changing this value to three or seven years. 20 The word "big" refers to countries that export or import a large amount of oil and gas. It does not refer to economic size, for instance, although the two measures are obviously correlated. 23SITC 3 did not exist until 1986 and there are problems of concordance between revision 2 and revision 3 (all these problems are documented in the online appendix). 21 Because of outliers, we use the natural logarithm of this variable in our models below. Results shown below are not sensitive to this decision.
FIGURE 4 The value of Spatial Competition (producer) for Nigeria over time (left); the value of Spatial Competition (consumer) for France over time (right).
Since Spatial Trade and Spatial Competition are highly correlated, we estimate our main explanatory variables in separate models.
22 Figure 4 plots the value of these two spatial variables (producer) for a top producer, that is, Nigeria, and for a top consumer, that is, France, over time. Strikingly, high values of Spatial Competition (producer) and Spatial Competition (consumer) are associated to membership in energy IGOs. This is particularly true for Nigeria. The graph shows also that Spatial Competition (producer) does not increase monotonically over time, mitigating the concern about serial correlation.
Control Variables
Besides reaction to trade and competition, several alternative causal mechanisms could drive the diffusion of energy IGOs. Thus, we include a set of control variables in our models to avoid overestimating the effect of the main explanatory variables. 22 We obtain similar results if we divide export and import (plugged into our connectivity matrices) by GDP. We do not opt for this operationalization in the main analysis since that is usually used as a proxy for trade openness, which is not part of our theoretical framework.
First of all, we include the variable Spatial Distance. This spatial lag term captures other diffusion effects that should be stronger between geographically close countries. This variable is particularly important since regionalization is one of the main features of the energy IGO networks (as described in the first section). We calculate this spatial lag by multiplying the reciprocal of distance by the number of energy IGOs that the other country signed onto within the past five years. Data on distance come from the GeoDist dataset collected by Mayer and Zignago (2011) . 23 We include several economic and political control variables in our model. Most of these variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems. Moreover, we include per capita GDP and the logarithm of Population. They measure economic development and size of a country and are collected by the IMF (2008) and the World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank 2008), respectively. We also control for the type of regime. Specifically, the variable Regime is the democracy score of country i at time t−1 from Polity IV. It combines the competitiveness and openness of executive selection, institutional constraints on executive authority, the competitiveness of political participation, and the rules that regulate political participation. Moreover, we control also for the number of absolute IGO membership (Total IGO) that states have individually joined. Data comes from the International Governmental Organization (IGO) Data (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004) .
Finally, we include some variables related to the energy sector. Energy Intensity controls for the vulnerability of a country to energy supply disruptions. It is a measure of energy efficiency and it is calculated in units of energy per unit of GDP. Nuclear Share and Hydro Share as alternative sources of energy are expected to lower the dependence on oil and gas. Similarly, Oil Reserves and Gas Reserves are expected to decrease the incentives to join an energy IGO. Oil Price controls for energy shocks. Oil and Gas Production and Oil and Gas Production control for the level of oil and gas exports and imports, respectively. Since these last two variables are heavily correlated, ρ = 0.82, we include them in two separate models. Note: We lose half of the observations by including energy-specific variables. Thus, we omit them from the baseline models. (Table 3 in the online appendix gives the descriptive statistics of the variables included into our models.)
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Model 1 shows the results for the baseline model, whereas Models 2-7 show the results for extended models (Table 1) . (We evaluated the overall model fit using Cox-Snell [Cox and Snell 1968] residuals. Figure A-1 in the online 23 The data are available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. appendix shows that there are no concerns regarding lack of fit by comparing the jagged line to the reference line. 24 Overall, the predictive power of our baseline model is therefore quite strong.)
Regarding Spatial Competition (producer), the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level in every model. Interestingly, Spatial Competition (producer) remains positive and statistically significant also when we include Spatial Distance (which is positive and statistically significant, as expected). This finding is important for us since Spatial Competition (producer) aims to capture economic proximity in general, and competition between producers in the oil and gas market, in particular. The fact that Spatial Competition (producer) remains statistically significant even after having included Spatial Distance reinforces our claim that Spatial Competition (producer) is not a mere proxy for a diffusion process that is geographically clustered.
These findings on the variable Spatial Competition (producer) confirms our hypothesis that membership in IGOs regulating energy can be seen as a collaboration game, which may have a "race to the bottom" as equilibrium. If a competitor of country A joins an IGO, this substantially increases the benefit of the membership for A, to minimize the risks of exclusion.
Conversely, the variable Spatial Competition (consumer) is not statistically significant at the conventional level and the sign of its coefficient is always negative. Thus, there is no evidence that competition between consumers in the oil and gas market is a driver of the proliferation of membership in energy IGOs. As the next section will show, this result can be explained by the fact that IGOs of producers are very different from IGOs of consumers. While an IGO of producers can be considered an oligopoly (even if an imperfect one) from which it is costly to be excluded, being left out of consumer IGOs produces low costs, weakening the trigger mechanism and the effect of the spatial lag. Figure 5 illustrates the magnitude of the effect for Spatial Competition (producer). Moving from the minimum to the maximum value to the first two variables makes a country substantially more likely to form (or join) an energy IGO. The effect of Spatial Competition (producer) on the probability of forming (joining) an IGO is particularly high in the middle of our time span, that is, the 1980s and 1990s, in which the region between the two curves widens substantially, that is, by more than 0.2. Since almost every country in the dataset is a member of at least one energy IGO by the end of the time period, the effect of our spatial terms decreases after 2000. Overall, these results show that the impact of our spatial lags on the dependent variable is not only statistically significant, but also substantively large.
Moreover, the other control variables have the expected signs (when they are statistically significant at the conventional level), adding plausibility to our results. Interestingly, the energy variables are never statistically significant though the sign of their coefficients is that which was expected. Finally, it is worth noting that p > 1 in the Weibull regression. This suggests that the hazard function is monotonically increasing. This result also supports our claim that as IGOs spread, it is increasingly more problematic for countries to be excluded from these organizations.
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Our theoretical framework spells out specific causal mechanisms that explain the diffusion of energy IGOs. In this section we provide further empirical evidence of these mechanisms' validity and check the robustness of our findings. First, we investigate the argument that the presence of a common infrastructure, such as an oil and gas pipeline, increases the incentives for energy policy cooperation between countries. This further test is particularly important since we found that competition between producers in the oil and gas market is an important driver of the proliferation of energy IGOs. Second, we have already suggested that energy IGOs are different from one another. As such, we explore how their design impacts the mechanism of diffusion through competition. Third, we distinguish between types of energy IGOs since, for instance, consumer IGOs pursue different goals than do producer IGOs. Fourth, we distinguish between oil market and gas market. Finally, we check if our results are sensitive to outliers or other model specifications.
The online appendix provides details of each of these additional analyses. Here it is enough to say that (1) oil and gas pipelines prove to be an important driver of the formation of energy IGOs; (2) there is mixed evidence that the design of energy IGOs matters; (3) competition among oil producers and competition among gas producers are both responsible for the proliferation of energy IGOs, although the effect of the latter variable is larger than the effect of the former; and (4) our main findings are not sensitive to sample selection, to outliers, or to other model specifications.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis has focused on the role of economic relations (in general) and trade relations (in particular) in explaining the proliferation of energy IGOs and the increase in their membership over the past four decades. On the one hand, our analysis emphasized the timing of the formation of an energy IGO as a response to the creation of an IGO by one's main competitors (for producers) and by countries sharing geoeconomic interests (for consumers). On the other hand, our models explained that when the incentives to coordinate energy policy are high, being excluded from existing energy IGOs is too costly for those countries that had originally decided to not cooperate. These two mechanisms in combination are responsible for the development of the "energy regime complex" developed analytically by Colgan et al. (2011) and described in the first part of the article.
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More particularly, we made three specific contributions to the literature on governance and international cooperation. First, we showed that producer countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships gained by their main trade partners and direct competitors in the oil and gas sector. Conversely, we found no evidence that the same mechanism holds for consumer countries. Second, we demonstrated that countries which share pipelines are more likely to join the same IGOs. Third, we showed that the design of energy IGOs affects the development of the network. Indeed, specific provisions included in or excluded from the treaties are responsible for speeding up or slowing down the proliferation of energy IGOs.
Our first result suggests that producer interests definitely outweigh consumer interests in the energy market, and this is reflected in the choice to join energy IGOs. Trade policy theory and collective action theory concur that collaboration among producer countries is possible under certain conditions. Collaboration is deemed necessary when states recognized that they would improve their condition through synchronized actions. Thus, when they find the existing system inadequate, producer states search for new frameworks of collaboration. This process is particularly relevant in the energy sector, as mostly energy companies in producer countries are owned by the state, assigning a particular relevance to public action.
The second finding speaks to the Regional Security Complex Theory literature on energy (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003) . Energy systems emerge where countries placed in a specific geographic area feel the need to secure their energy policy under the umbrella of a regional energy IGO. A common infrastructure, such as a regional pipeline, requires a common management and a united response in case of external shocks, for example, oil and gas shortages. Thus, the existence of pipelines calls states to collectively administer the infrastructure through institutionalized cooperation, that is, through membership in an energy IGO.
The third finding on the importance of IGO design is particularly noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, while the literature on the diffusion of international organizations and international institutions is large, little attention has been paid to their design (Baccini and Dür 2012; Beckfield 2008; Elkins et al. 2006) . Our study showed that in explaining the diffusion of IGOs, the design should be taken into account both theoretically and empirically. For instance, the strong effect of the variable Spatial Competition Oligopoly (producers) demonstrated how relevant provisions about oligopoly are when export states have to decide whether to join an energy IGO. Indeed, countries include or exclude specific provisions from the treaty to gain a relative advantage over their economic and political competitors. Thus, the influence of design touches both the countries' energy trade choices and their geostrategies.
Second, our article suggests that provisions included in the treaty of an IGO are not independent from provisions included in treaties of similar IGOs. For instance, forming an IGO (for example, OPEC) which includes provisions creating an oligopolistic system triggers other IGOs (for example, OAPEC) to have similar provisions in their treaties. Future studies should further explore the role of geostrategic variables in the formation of energy IGOs and develop their operationalization. Subsequent studies should also model the process of diffusion of the design or template of international organizations using ad hoc spatial terms instead of limiting the analysis to only the formation of such organizations.
Finally, the institutional density of the energy IGO network through time suggests that IGOs are likely to continue to expand and that, due to competition mechanisms, we may expect new IGOs to emerge and current IGOs to continue expanding. A few preliminary examples confirm this vision. For instance, Yemen and Angola declared their will to fully join the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) to coordinate their price and market development with the other GECF competitors. Similarly, Iran has been insisting to enter the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) because SCO involves its main regional competitors and partners, both for its upstream and midstream operations. Finally, the foundation by 75 members of IRENA, the 2009 agency for renewable energy, has soon gathered 58 applications to membership. It would therefore be useful to dedicate future studies to the energy IGOs' rate of expansion, both from the qualitative and empirical point of view, and verify whether IGOs' proliferation continues.
